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Trajectories from public sector of research to private sector : 
 an analysis using French data on young PhD graduates 
Pierre Béretª, Jean-François Giret§, Isabelle Recotilletª 
 
 
Abstract :  
The organisation of research is a powerful factor structuring the labour market for recent 
doctorate recipients. The queue for permanent research positions in the academic sector has 
created a specific labour market for young doctorates, characterised by a proliferation of post-
doctoral programmes and fixed-term contracts. In that specific context, our paper deals with 
the way the young PhD graduates enter the labour market, the way they get a job as researcher 
in the private or public sector and how much the return of the job mobility from the public 
academic sector to the private sector is. Using a longitudinal survey provided by the Cereq, 
our results suggest that even if nearly the half of the cohort has a direct access to jobs in the 
research sector (private or public), 20% remain in trajectories dominated by under-qu lified 
jobs or recurrent unemployment. Our empirical investigation show a negative or non 
significant returns of the job mobility from the public academic sector to the private sector.
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The French academic system yields around 10 000 PhD per year, so that France is among 
countries which have a huge number of young PhD. Comparatively, Europe has 68 000 new 
PhD each year and USA more than 40 000 (Nsf, 2002). Young PhD, being the main producers 
of knowledge, are mainly employed in the public sector for research (Béret, Giret and 
Recotillet, 2002), however, for a while, they are attracted to the private sector. 
 
One of the major transformations of doctoral training occurring during the last decade is the 
multiplication of the links between the academic sector and the R&D sector (Beltramo, Paul 
and Perret, 2001), encouraged by the new orientations of the public policy of the public sector 
for research. Since the mid-nineties, the papers dealing with the analysis of job opportunities 
for young doctorates show an increasing proportion of them employed in the private sector 
(Béret, Giret and Recotillet, 2003 ; Martinelli and Molinari, 2000). Young scientists, 
especially those with degrees in mechanics, engineering sciences or computer science, are 
more and more attracted to the private sector and less and less to academic careers.  
 
The organisation of research is a powerful factor structuring the labour market for recent 
doctorate recipients. One particular point relates to research jobs in academic systems. The 
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queue for permanent research positions has created a specific labour market for young 
doctorates, characterised by a proliferation of post-doctoral programmes and fixed-term 
contracts financed by research contracts immediately after obtaining the doctorate. In that 
specific context, our paper deals with the way the young PhD graduates enter the labour 
market, the way they get a job as researcher in the private or public sector and how much the 
return of the job mobility from the public academi sector (PAS) to the private sector is. It is 
useful in that context to remember that the governmental policies tend to improve transfers 
between academia and industrial R&D for young PhD. In our sample, young PhD students 
have graduated in exact sciences and human and social sciences in 1998 and are surveyed in 
2001. The survey has been carried out by the Cereq. The longitudinal information allows us to 
study the job mobility between the public academic sector and the private sector.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews some analytical issues and 
theoretical considerations on the regulation of labor market for young scientists. The data we 
use in this analysis is described in section 3. Section 4 presents an empirical analysis of the 
data which addresses a first overview of the main trajectories of PhD graduates on the labor 
market. Section 5 focuses on the trajectories characterised by a job mobility from the public to 
the private sector. In this section, we develop a non parametric matching estimator to compare 
the wages obtained in the private sector, depending on a prior experience or not in the public 
and/or academic sector. Finally, section 6 discusses some implications of our results.  
 
2. The labor market for doctorates: sometheoretical aspects 
 
Recent improvements in the data available about the doctorates labor market have given rise 
to a growing body of literature. Most studies argued the wage competition model of the 
standard neoclassic theory fails to explain the allocation of manpower on this market. If most 
of them agreed on the existence on different segments (Ehrenberg, 1992), few are focused on 
barriers between them.  
 
Generally, the offer-side theories, notably the job search theory, are under developed to 
explain this mobility of PhD doctorates. One notable exception is the study by Zucker and alii 
(1999) who model labor mobility as a function of scientist’s quality (as measured by scientific 
citations) and his or her reservation wage. As shown by Freeman (1980), and more recently 
by Stern (1999), the wage incitation is rather low for young PhD doctorates and some other 
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determinants should be used to enlighten strategies of job mobility. The paper published by 
Stern in 1999 explicitly illustrates how the researchers pay to be scientists on the American 
labour market, based on the observation that research activities are less attractive in terms of 
wages. In a slightly different perspective, using French data on young PhD graduates, Giret, 
Perret and Recotillet (2003) analyse the return of years of doctoral training regarding the 
choice of finding a job in the private sector, and especially in the R&D sector. They show that 
even if doctoral training has a positive effect on recruitment in the PSR, they do not gain 
greater wages than engineers.  
 
From the demand-si e in the private sector, if a considerable amount of papers has been 
written concerning the cooperation between university research and scientific activity in 
industry, little has been written considering the impac  technology transfer has in doctorates 
careers and mobility between the two sectors. As Stephan (2001) points out, technology 
transfer may have direct and indirect education implications for PhD students. Indirectly, 
faculty may affect the curriculum by initiating new program or updating training. Directly, 
technology transfers offer the possibility of linking students to industry more efficiently, by 
providing opportunities for industries and students to meet (Stephan, 2001, p.201). However, 
she noted that technology transfers have the potential to have negative impacts on students by 
changing the nature of the relationship between faculty and student or postdocs. This seems to 
be the case for the US biomedical research where private funding may divert them from their 
academic research without completion of their degree.  
 
However, our main question is to know if technology transfer may affect the recruitment and 
the mobility of new doctorates between the two sectors. In France, the organization of 
research and development within companies seems to generate a particular situation for the 
recruitment with competition between the elite engineering schools graduates and the PhD 
graduates. As noted in Beltramo, Paul and Perret (2001), several factors may explain the large 
percentage of industrial researchers recruited from shorter degrees than a PhD, whereas the 
latter is the minimum level required for academic research. Firstly, the internal cooperation 
inside the firm between R&D and the other functions explains that engineering graduates are 
more efficient in maintaining links with production due to the tacit knowledge exchanged 
during the process and the advantages gained by a “common culture”. Secondly, the reduction 
of R&D costs of producing in line with an externalisation of R&D, may lead to a decrease in 
the demand of PhD graduates without reducing the possibility of being able to assimilate 
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outside information and scientific knowledge (Beltramo, Paul and Perret ; 2001, p.822). 
Furthermore, their cases studies show that if the company adopt a career path where 
researcher may access high positions outside the R&D activity, it gives  preference to the 
recruitment of engineering graduates, who are more adaptable and mobile than PhD 
graduates. So, as Béret (2002) noted it, the proportion of PhD among industrial researchers is 
not increasing in France. 
  
The queue for permanent research positions in the French labor market (Martinelli and 
Molinari, 2000, Mangematin, 2001, Béret and alii, 2002) has created a specific labor market 
for young doctorates, characterised by a proliferation of post-doctoral programmes and fixed-
term contracts financed by research contracts immediately after award of the doctorate. In the 
public academic sector, recruitment for a for pemanent job depend to the opportunities to 
placement which are less frequent than the job offers. In the job competition model, Thurow 
posits that potential employees are ranked in a labor queue by employers based on their 
personal characteristics. When job openings arise, employers select those individuals at the 
top of the respective labor queue. Consequently, workers will occupy different position in the 
public and in private labor queue. PhD graduates possessing a particular set of characteristics 
will be considered desirable for some jobs and the same time, undesirable for the others. As 
Romer (2000, p.33) noted it to explain the difficulties of PhD graduates in the US labor 
market, the key point is to distinguish between people who are trained exclusively for 
employment in research universities and people who can work in research and development in 
the private sector.  
 
Offering a fixed term contract in public academic research is a mean to observe research 
productivity, specially for university or public research center which does not recruit their 
PhD student. Moreover, postdoctorates and other fixed-term contracts with their short tenure 
provide considerable flexibility to the recruitment and reduce the asymmetric information on 
the ability. If, generally, those who demonstrate exceptional potential are immediately 
recruited in securing positions, the competition between the others has been getting more 
intense. The point is to know whether the potential productivity of PhD graduates employed 
in public fixed-term contracts gives an advantage or a better position in the labor queue for a 
private R&D job. It will depend on employer preference. However, if the end of the fixed-
term contract in the academic sector is considered as a failure, it seems to be doubtful that
R&D companies recruit these graduates. If the recruitment of scientist from the public 
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academic sector is a mean to introduce their researcher into scientific networks (Arora and 
Gambardella, 1997), reputation and membership within the same scientific community, the 
drop-out in the access to the public sector can be viewed as the signal of a lower potential and 
associated with a reputation of lower quality research. The quality of the scientist level has 
also a strong impact on the technology transfer. As Zucker and alii (1997) showed for the 
biotechnology industries in the US labor market, only the very valuable intellectual human 
capital, “the star scientist”, with high quality publications, would serve as a basis for mobility 
from university o firm. On the other hand, a first job in the public research sector may be 
considered as a more valuable experience and thus, a more profitable recruitment than a 
graduate without experience on the labor market. As Robin showed it (2002), a moderate 
teaching activity during the PhD increases one's chance to get a private research contract : 
teaching skills may act as a signal of one's communicative skills, a type of skills highly valued 
by firms.  
 
3. The Data 
The study uses data from the "Generation 98" survey, a sample of 55 000 individuals leaving 
the French educational system in 1998 and interviewed in 2001, carried out for the Cereq. The 
"Génération 98" includes useful information on young people characteristics (family ‘s 
socioeconomic status, age, hi hest grade completed, highest grade attended, university area, 
job…) and work history since 1998 until 2001. Of the 55 000 school leavers, we reduce the 
sample to 1265 respondents leaving higher education with a PhD. Data are also available for 
two other cohorts, those graduated in 94 and 96. However, for the first cohort, the sample size 
did not allow a detailed analysis by field level. Moreover, only the database for those 
graduated in 1998, contains an exhaustive longitudinal information on the first hree years of 
active life of the cohort. 
 
Table 1 shows the occupational allocation of doctorates for the three cohorts, three years 
following graduation, in the public sector, in the academic public sector and in the R&D 
sector. We can observe that the part of graduates employed in the public sector fall 
dramatically since 1997: for the last cohort, less than one graduate on two is recruited in the 
public sector. The decrease of the part of employment in the public academic sector mainly 
explains the general fall of the employment in the public sector. This pattern is likely to 
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reflect more restricted access to job recruitment in the public research sector, in Cnrs1 or 
higher education than in the middle of the nineties (for example,see Bideault and Rossi, 
2003). However, contrary to what may be expected, the proportion of PhD in the R&D private 
sector did not increase in the same proportion, except for those who completed an engineering 
schools before their PhD or who were graduated in mechanics, engineerig sciences or 
computer science. As highlighted in table 1, differences exists by discipline levels. Generally, 
the recruitment in public sector, notably in the academic sector is still important for PhD 
graduates in social and human science: in 2001, the majority is employed in the public 
academic sector whereas only one third of graduates in exact science is in this sector. 
However, in economics, law and management sciences and in chemistry, the number of 
graduates in the public academic sector increases. 
 
In table 2, we present the motilities between the two sectors. During the three year following 
the PhD graduation, 20% of doctorates obtain successive jobs in the private and in the public 
sectors, the majority moves from the pubic to the private sector.  
 
                                         
1 National scientific center 
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Table 1 – Occupation position 3 years after graduation 
 Part of graduates employed 
in the public sector 
Part of graduates 
employed in the public 
academic sector 
Part of graduates employed in 
the private R&D sector 
Cohorts  1997 1999 2001 1997 1999 2001 1997 1999 2001 
          
PhD graduates 66 61 53 51 50 40 15 16 18 
PhD graduates in exact 
sciences 
61 54 47 48 47 35 18 22 24 
PhD graduates in human 
and social sciences 
85 76 70 64 57 53 1 2 1 
PhD graduates who 
completed an engineering 
schools 
66 51 35 56 46 33 19 36 40 
By discipline           
Mathematics and 
physical sciences 
- 58 43 - 51 30 - 21 26 
Mechanics, 
engineering sciences or 
computer science 
- 50 36 - 42 27 - 25 31 
Chemistry - 40 51 - 34 39 - 31 25 
Life sciences, geology - 62 60 - 53 44 - 16 14 
Economics, law and 
management sciences 
- 63 73 - 50 60 - 4 1 
Humanities - 84 68 - 61 43 - 1 1 
Céreq 
Table 2 – Mobility between the public and the private sector 
 
PhD graduates in 
exact sciences 
PhD graduates in 
human and social 
sciences 
Alll 
All the jobs in the private sector 40,5 29,2 37,4 
All the jobs in the public sector 39,2 58,4 44,4 
Mobility from the private to the public sector 5,5 5,7 
Mobility from the public to the private sector 9,4 8,0 
More than one mobility between the two sectors 5,4 
 
12,3 
4,5 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Céreq 
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4. A first statistical overview of the trajectories of PhD graduates 
The transition to the labor market for PhD graduates consists of a number of successive 
stages: unemployment, employment in public academi sector, in the private R&D sector, in 
others jobs in the private or public sectors. As Stephan and Levin (2001) pointed out, the first 
three or so years, following the end of the PhD are critical to the scientist level and the career 
in the academic sector. For the French PhD graduated in 1998, our data allows us to identify 
precisely the early career stages. The surveys shows this phase in the form of a "calendar" for 
a period of three year after graduation. This calendar includes a monthly information on the 
various stages occupied on the labor market, the duration of the stage, the transition from one 
stage to another. 
 For example, for three individuals, the calendar is :  
 
1 PhD U U U P P P P P P --- --- P 
2 PhD PhD U U U U P R R R --- --- R 
3 PhD R R R R R R R R R --- --- U 
 t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 T7 t8 t9 t10   t40 
 
 where   PhD= at PhD 
  U=  unemployment 
 P= employment in the public academic sector  
 R= employment in the private R&D sector  
 
Understanding transition from school to work needs to mak  a full use of these calendars. Our 
strategy aims at taking account of all the information provided by the calendar. In so doing, 
we define a concept of "typical paths" in order to obtain several representative and 
homogeneous paths from the 1265 calendars in our database. Typical paths can be calculated 
by several methods (for example see Abbott and Hrycak, 1990). From a general point of view, 
the problem is to define the distance between trajectories and to parse data automatically in 
such a way that the paths that lay close be grouped together. It is thus possible to define path 
classes and to obtain a polychotomous variable that indicates to which class a person belongs. 
We used here the variant developed at LIHRE (Espinasse, 1992). The distance is written as: 
 
 Di,j = St Xt   with  Xt = 1 if Si,t# Sj,t 
    Xt = 0 if Si,t= Sj,t  
 
where Si,t  is the position of the person i at the instant t. Clusters are then made up through an 
ascending hierarchical classification. 
 
The graphs (see Appendix 1) give an o rview of the main trajectories of PhD graduates in 
the labor market. 9 trajectories may be distinguished:  
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- 1: a delayed access to the public academic sector (employment in public research or in 
higher education): 8% of PhD graduates, 
- 2: a stabilization in under-qualified jobs: 6% of PhD graduates, 
- 3: a delayed access to a qualified job (professional, manager, outside the public or 
private research sector) following an unemployment spell: 5% of PhD graduates, 
- 4: a direct stabilization in the privat  R&D sector: 17% of PhD graduates, 
- 5: a delayed access in under-qualified jobs after an unemployment spell:  2% of PhD 
graduates, 
- 6: a progressive exit from the public academic sector: 4% of PhD graduates, 
- 7: a direct stabilization in the public academic sector: 32% of PhD graduates,  
- 8: a direct stabilization in a qualified job (professional, manager): 18% of PhD graduates, 
- 9: recurrent unemployment: 8% ofPhD graduates. 
 
Two trajectories seem to be problematic: the trajectory of recurrent unemploym a d the 
trajectory of progressive exit from the public academic sector. 75% of graduates in the first 
trajectory spent at least twenty months of unemployed and about 66% were unemployed in 
March 2001. For the second trajectory, the exit from the public was followed by an 
unemployment spell with different consequences for the graduated: if more than 40% 
accessed a qualified job (outside the research sector), 33% were still unemployed. However, it 
is important to note that two other trajectories with less unemployment are also problematic: 
10% of PhD graduates could only access under-qualified jobs, directly (8%) or indirectly 
(2%). For the majority, professional downgrading is a recurrent situation in the labor market.  
 
Finally, the five other trajectories, which gather 80% of PhD graduates, represents a more 
favourable transition : in 2001, three years after graduation, doctorates had worked in a 
qualified job since at least one year. However two trajectories didn’t lead to the private or 
public resarch sector, respectively 5% and 18% of graduates find more or less easily 
qualified jobs outside the research sector. Three trajectories lead to private or public research 
sectors. It is important to note that we found only one trajectory for the access to the privat  
sector but two trajectories for the public sector. In the private sector, the recruitment follows 
the graduation immediately and the risk to exit this sector is very low. In the public academic 
sector, we observe two kinds of transition : a direct access for 32% of graduates and a delayed 
access for 8% of graduates, the half of them were unemployed for at least 6 months following 
their Ph.D. 
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Table 3 shows the distribution of graduates by discipline group. The most notable difference 
is probably the relative high percentage of PhD graduates in exact sciences in the trajectory of 
access to the private research sector. Conversely, graduates in human and social sciences are 
more numerous in the trajectory of direct stabilization in the public academic sector nd in the 
trajectory of recurrent unemployment.  
 
Table 3. A typology of trajectories of PhD students in the labor market.  
 
 Exact sciences Human and social 
sciences 
All 
a delayed access to the public 
academic sector. 
9% 8% 8% 
a stabilization in under-
qualified jobs 
5% 6% 6% 
a delayed access to a qualified 
job 
6% 5% 5% 
direct stabilization in the 
private R&D sector 
23% 17% 17% 
a delayed access in under-
qualified jobs after an 
unemployment spell 
2% 2% 2% 
a progressive exit from the 
public academic sector 
4% 4% 4% 
a direct stabilization in the 
public academic sector 
29% 32% 32% 
a direct stabilization in a 
qualified job 
17% 18% 18% 
recurrent unemployment 5% 8% 8% 
 
 
5. A non parametric matching estimator to assess the return for a job experience in the 
PSR 
In this section, we try to assess the impact of a job in the public or academic sector on the 
subsequent wage earned in the private sector or in the R&D private sector. In that sense, we 
need to turn to the econometric evaluation literature, widely developed on that topic for 
twenty or so years (see for example the huge number of papers published by Heckman on that 
topic) and to refer to studies on treatment effects (Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998). 
We are interested here in the mpact of a treatment T1 (being employed in the public and/or 
academic sector after graduation) in comparison to the non-trea ment situation T0 on a 
targeted outcome, the wage earned for those employed in the private sector 3 years after 
graduation. The well known problem that arises in that typical evaluation exercise is the bias 
due to the use of a non randomised sample. To overcome to this problem, a vast literature on 
statistical non parametric matching estimator has been developed in the last ten years 
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(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998; Becker and Ichino, 2002 ; Dehejia and Wahba, 
1999, 2002…) following the publication of Rosenbaum and Robin in 1983. 
The aim of these methods is to obtain an average treatment effect as if experimental data were 
used for computation and is given by the following difference:
 
 ( ) ( )1 0E W T 1 E W T 0= - =  [1] 
 
That means one need to construct from the population of interest a control group and a treated 
group. However we do not observe W0, the outcome of interest the participants would have 
had they not participated. This not observed outcome is the so-called counterfactual 
expectation, ( )0E W T 1= . Because the counterfactual is by construction unobservable, we 
need to estimate it on the basis of the observable expectations, ( )1E W T 1=  and 
( )0E W T 0= . In other words, we prone to use a non parametric matching estimator which 
consist of establish a control group for the non treated such that the control is very closed to 
the treated group according to the vector X of observables. From a statistical point of view, it 
implies that: XTW0^ , so that the treatment effect of the treated is the difference between the 
wage expectation in the control and treated groups. 
Since the matching procedure requires that the two groups are elaborated conditionally on the 
X’s, one should find two distinctive groups for which the X’s are the same. In so doing, the 
method is inappropriate and the use of a propensity score obtained from a Logit or Probit 
estimation overcome the problem. This way of doing allows us to get a unique number for 
each set of similar X’s. And, as Rosenbaum and Robin pointed out, for the same propensity 
score in the two groups, one get the same distribution of the entire vector X independently of 
the treatment. This is the so-called balancing property of the propensity score and its 
guarantees that the construction of the two groups is random. Furthermore, the computation of 
the propensity score might be restricted to the common support of the X’s, so that the 
computation is restricted to units for which the value of the X overlaps for the treated and 
control groups. At this stage, it is still not possible to implement the non parametric matching 
estimator. Actually, as the probability to observe two individuals with the same propensity 
score is closed to zero, we need to make use of complementary methods (for details, see 
Becker and Ichino (2002) or Dehejia and Wehba (1999)). Four methods are in use in this 
paper, the nearest neighbour method, the stratification method, the radius method and the 
kernel method, which seems to have the best properties (Heckman, Ichimura and Tood, 1998; 
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Hirano, Imbens and Ridder, 2000). Briefly, the stratification method consists of splitti g the 
propensity score distribution into intervals on which treated and control units have the same 
average of the propensity score. The nearest neighbour is based on finding the units for which 
the propensity score is the closest. The radius method restrict the definition of the nearest 
neighbour to an predefined interval, so that it is usually better to use the radius method. The 
Kernel method allows us to smooth the split into several intervals in taking weighted average 
conversely proportional to the distance between the propensity score of the two groups.  
 
Applied to our sample, the results are given in the following tables2 (tables 1 to 3). Three 
empirical tests have been carried out : the first one try to assess the return for a job mobility 
from public to private sector without any condition on activity research. Depending on the 
chosen method, the confidence value varies, implying a different interpretation of the test. 
Three methods on four give us a significant average treatment effect for the treated. More 
precisely, the assessment show a wage loss when coming from the public sector, such that 
there is apparently no paid knowledge transfer for this kind of job mobility. It is more likely 
because the treated have not found a tenure job in th  public that they turned to the private 
sector. In that case, the employers on the private sector sanction the graduates by offering 
wages lower than those offered to those who have not been in the public sector before. 
Table 1 – Job mobility from public to private sector 
Job mobility from public to 
private sector 
 
Number of treated: 150 
Average treatment 
effect 
Bootstrapped standard 
error 
Confidence value 
Nearest Neighbour method -192.787 103.003 -1.872* 
Radius method -127.140 59.369 -2.142** 
Stratification method -180.965 62.622 -2.890*** 
Kernel method -110.863 69.799 -1.588 
 
Our second investigation consists of assessing the job mobility from the public sector of 
research (so-called PSR) to the private sector, including R&D activities. The computations 
rather show convergent evidence, although two average treatment effects are not significantly 
different from zero. However, it seems that the average treatment effect is greater in a 
negative way on the wage earned in the private sector. One might assume that specific 
competencies, particular science knowledge-bas  have no wage counterparts in the private 
                                         
2 The computation have been done with Stata 7.0 software using the Stata programs written by Becker and 
Ichino (2002). 
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sector. As in the precedent case, PhD beginning their career by job in the PSR are sanctioned 
in the private sector, me had they came from the overall public sector. 
 Table 2 –Job mobility from public sector of research to private sector 
Job mobility from PSR to 
private sector 
 
Number of treated: 116 
Number of control units:  
Average treatment effect Bootstrapped standard 
error 
Confidence value 
Nearest Neighbour method -221.110 116.465 -1.899* 
Radius method -118.233 79.068 -1.495 
Stratification method -157.725 64.978 -2.427** 
Kernel method -113.483 71.935 -1.578 
 
Finally, our third empirical test try to estimate the difference in wage expectation for PhD 
graduates employed in the R&D private sector between those having been treated (that is a 
job experience in the PSR after graduation) and those who had not. None of our estimations 
confirm that there is a wage premium for this kind of trajectory. Nevertheless, the value of the 
average treatment effect decreases significantly, so that the sanction operated by private 
employers in the R&D sector is not so valuable. If a knowledge transfer exists,it could be not 
solely materialized by a significant improvement of the wage earned. So that we are rather in 
favour of the assumption that a job mobility from the PSR to the private R&D has a slightly 
different meaning than the one given in the theoretical background we developed in the 
second section.  
Table 3 – Job mobility from public sector of research to private industrial research 
Job mobility from PSR to R&D private sector 
 
Number of treated units: 35 
Number of control units: 139 (except for the 
NN method, 31) 
Average treatment 
effect 
Bootstrapped standard 
error 
Confidence 
value 
Nearest Neighbour method 26.114 143.082 0.183 
Radius method -21.162 104.212 -0.203 
Stratification method -30.880 93.837 -0.329 
Kernel method -19.564 108.416 -0.180 
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6. Concluding remarks 
As we pointed out in the introduction of the paper, few papers have been devoted to labour 
market for young scientists in France and especially on the particular topic of the evaluation 
of doctoral training in the mobility’s from public sector for research to private sector. The 
specific patterns of transition from school to work for young PhD associated to a very singular 
organization of public research in France had created a narrow labour market for research. 
However, for a while, the public sector for research is no more the principal employer of 
young doctorates in exact sciences, whereas in human and social sciences, the recruitments in 
the public sector are still the most job opportunities (Béret, Giret and Recot ll , 2002). The 
transformation of job opportunities for young scientists is accompanied by the public policy 
for research which encourages the development of links between universities and firms.  
Our knowledge of career paths for young doctorates is rather limited, at least in France and 
this paper attempts to improve the empirical knowledge on that topic. The first empirical part 
of the paper precisely described the trajectories for these young doctorates, showing that even 
if nearly the half of the cohort has a direct access to jobs in the research sector (private or 
public), some remain in trajectories dominated by under-qualified jobs or in recurrent 
unemployment. Another problematic trajectory consists of a progressive exit from public 
sector. To go further in that direction, the last section investigates the differences between the 
doctorates who had jobs in the public and then in the private sector and the doctorates who 
directly entered the private sector. Using a non parametric matching estimator to controlled 
for the selection bias due to the choice of one or the other sector, we show that there is no 
positive wage gain when quitting the PSR. Whereas the theoretical backgrounds show 
evidence of a positive effect on career paths for researchers moving from PSR to R&D sector, 
our results are more in favour of no effect, at least, on the wage earned in the private sector. 
At the beginning of the career a such mobility does not overlap the global framework 
considered in theoretical developments. That means that this is likely more the PhD graduates 
who are not recruited on tenure positions that move in the first years. Consequently, there is 
more certainly a negative signal effect behind this result, which counterbalances the 
knowledge transfer effect. 
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A delayed access to a qualified job
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A progressive exit from the public academic sector
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A direct stabilization in a qualified job
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Recurrent unemployment
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